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More than a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
execution of the mentally retarded under the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States constitution.' It is estimated that from July of 1976' 
through February of 1998, the United States executed at least thirty-four 
mentally retarded people.3 Between twelve and twenty percent of current 
death row inmates are mentally retarded.4 As the pace of executions 
quickens,5 more mentally retarded individuals will be executed. 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Bana Roberts, Federal Magistrate for the United States Dis- 
trict Court for the Western District of Oklahoma; B.A., University of Wisconsin 1982; J.D., Tu- 
lane Law School 1987. 
I .  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that the 
Court "cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally 
retarded person . . . simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone"). The Eighth Amend- 
ment of the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
2. On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty as a constitutional form 
of punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Rob- 
erts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). For a general discussion of Gregg and its companion 
cases, see Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth. Report Regnrrling Itt~plenret~tntiot~ of tile Atnericnl~ 
Bnr Associntiott S Recomnlendntions nnd Resol~rtions Coi~cerlling tlte Dent11 Pel~nlty nrtd Cnllirlg 
for n Morntori~rnt on Execlrtions, 4 GEO. J .  ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 7-9 (1996); RANDALL 
COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 107-23 (1994). 
3. See Death Penalty Information Center, Defenrlnttts lvitl~ Mentnl Retnrrlntion E.recuter1 in 
tlte United Stntes Since the Dent11 Petlnlty Wns Reblstnted in 1976 (last modified Feb. 25, 2000) 
~http://www.essential.org/dpic>; Jonathan L. Bing, Comment, Proteaing tlre Menmlfy Retnrrled 
from Cnpitnl P~rnishltrenr: State Efforts Since Penry ntrrl Reconl~rrenrlntiom for tile Artlrre, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (1996). 
4. Death Penalty Information Center (last modified Feb. 25,2000) 
<http://www.essentiaI.org/dpic>. 
5. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 56 people were executed in 1995,45 
people were executed in 1996, 74 people were executed in 1997, 68 people were executed in 
1998, and 98 people were executed in 1999. Within the tirst two months of the year 2000, 18 
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Although the Supreme Court has approved the execution of mentally 
retarded criminals, and several states have executed mentally retarded 
inmates, this practice is plainly out of step with international conven- 
t i o n ~ , ~  American Bar Association policy,7 and the positions taken by the 
American Association of Mental Retardation ("AAMR)' as well as 
other mental health ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n s . ~  A majority of Americans, including 
those who favor capital punishment, oppose the execution of the men- 
tally retarded.'' Over the past decade, Congress and a number of states 
have enacted legislation specifically exempting the mentally retarded 
from the death penalty. In light of these actions, the propriety of execut- 
ing the mentally retarded is once again being addressed by courts" and 
legal commentators1' and remains an important and compelling issue 
that requires close attention. This Article will explore (1) the unique 
issues surrounding the trials of mentally retarded criminal defendants 
charged with capital offenses;I3 (2) Penry v. ~ ~ i z a u ~ l ~ , ' ~  in which the 
U.S. Supreme Court approved the execution of the mentally retarded; 
(3) recent trends in this area of death penalty jurisprudence; and (4) the 
future direction of the law regarding the execution of the mentally re- 
tarded. 
people were executed. See id. 
6. See get~ernlly Elizabeth Olson, Good Friends Join Etret~ries To Criticize U.S. or1 H~rnmn 
Riglzts. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 1 I ;  EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION, 39 (1 993). 
7. Coyne & Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 49; REED, s~rprn note 6, at 38. 
8. Anlericnn Associntior~ on hlentnl Retnrdntion. Fnct Slreet: T11e Dent11 Pertnlty (last up- 
dated Jan. 30, 2001) <http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqdeathpenalty.html; REED, srrprn note 6, at 
37. 
9. Among the mental health organ~zations that oppose the execution of the mentally retarded 
are: the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States, the American Psychological Asso- 
ciation, the Association for Persons w ~ t h  Severe Handicaps, the American Association of Univer- 
sity Affiliated Programs for the Developmentally Disabled, the National Association of Private 
Residential Resources, the New York Association for Retarded Children, Inc., the National Asso- 
ciation of Superintendents of Public Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, the Mental 
Health Law Project, and the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems. REED, 
slrprn note 6, at 37-38. 
10. See Denis W. Keyes & William J. Edwards, Mentnl Retnrhrion nnd the Dent11 Pennl~y: 
Current Stntus of Exenlption Legislntion, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 687, 688 
n. 15 (1 997); REED, s~rprn note 6 ,  at 30-32. 
I I .  See, e.g., People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999); Lambert v. State, 984 P.2d 221 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1999), cert. (letlied, 528 U.S. 1087 (2000). 
12. See, e.g., Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Cntegoricnl E.rel~tptions to tire Dent11 
Pennlty: Reflections on tlte ABA S Resolutiot~s Cot~cerning the Esec~rrion of J~n~eniles nnd Persons 
wit11 Menml Retartlation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1998); Keyes & Edwards, slrprn note 
10; Bing, supra note 3. 
13. The leading article on the mentally retarded crim~nal defendant is James W. Ellis & Ruth 
A. Luckasson, hlenfnlly Retnrded Cr i t~~ innl  Defendnnts, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414,422 (1985). 
14. 492 U.S. 302 (1 989). 
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11. THE MENTALLY RETARDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 
A. Definitions of Mental Retardation 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental ~isorders" 
("DSM-IV") defines the mentally retarded individual as someone who 
has "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" accom- 
panied with "significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least 
two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety."I6 To fit 
within this definition, one's intellectual and adaptive deficits must mani- 
fest themselves by the time the individual is eighteen years old." 
A determination that an individual has sub-average intelligence is 
based on Intelligence Quotient ("IQ") scores that may be obtained 
through the administration of one of several standardized intelligence 
tests, including Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children--Revised, 
Stanford-Binet, and Kaufman Assessment Battery for children.I8 The 
mean score for intelligence is an IQ of 100. The DSM-IV rates the fol- 
lowing IQ scores as indicative of mental retardation: 
IQ 50-55 to approximately 70: mild mental retardationI9 
IQ 35-40 to 50-55: moderate mental retardation 
IQ 20-25 to 35-40: severe mental retardation 
IQ below 20-25: profound mental retardati~n.~' 
However, the DSM-IV notes that individuals with IQ scores in the range 
of seventy-one to seventy-five also may be mentally retarded if they 
have significant deficits in adaptive f~nc t ion in~ .~ '  
The DSM-IV defines adaptive functioning skills-the second prong 
of this definition of mental retardation-as "the presenting symptoms in 
individuals with Mental ~etardat ion."~~ Individuals' adaptive function- 
ing "refers to how effectively individuals cope with common life de- 
15. A ~ ~ E R I C A N  PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Put out by the American Psychiatric 
Association, this treatise is a comprehensive classification and reference manual on mental disor- 
ders, their manifestations, and treatment. 
16. Id. at 39. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 40. The upper limit of IQ scores for those persons with mild mental retardation is 
two standard deviations below the mean score. 
20. DSM-IV, supra note 15, at 40. 
21. Id. at45. 
22. Id. at 40. 
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mands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence 
expected of someone in their particular age group, socio-cultural back- 
ground, and community setting."'3 The DSM-IV notes that "[aldaptive 
functioning may be influenced by various factors, including education, 
motivation, personality characteristics, social and vocational opportuni- 
ties, and the mental disorders and general medical conditions that may 
coexist with Mental ~etardation." '~ Like IQ scores, there are certain 
standardized tests that measure one's adaptive functioning ski~ls. '~ 
Medical evaluations and school assessments are also useful in making 
this determinati~n.'~ In addition, "[p]roblems in adaptation are more 
likely to improve with remedial efforts than is the cognitive IQ, which 
tends to remain a more stable attribute."" 
Persons classified as mildly retarded, formerly referred to as "edu- 
cable," constitute approximately eighty-five percent of the mentally re- 
tarded population." These mildly retarded individuals have a substantial 
disability. They can attain academic skills only up to a sixth grade 
l eve~ . '~  Such individuals may achieve skills adequate for self-support; 
however, to achieve independence in living, these individuals may re- 
quire supervision, guidance, and other support.30 Persons with moderate 
mental retardation comprise ten percent of the mentally retarded popula- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  These individuals are unlikely to attain academic skills beyond 
the second grade leveL3' Moderately retarded individuals can attend to 
their personal care with moderate supervision, may perform unskilled or 
semi-skilled work under supervision, and may learn to travel to familiar 
places independently.33 During adolescence, moderately retarded indi- 
viduals may have difficulty recognizing social conventions, and this 
difficulty may interfere with relationships with peers.34 Three to four 
percent of the mentally retarded population are classified as severely 
retarded.35 The severely retarded may learn to talk during the school-age 
period and may be trained in elementary self-care skills.36 The pro- 
foundly retarded, which constitute one to two percent of the mentally 
retarded population, display considerable impairments and require con- 
~~ ~ 
Irl. 
I d .  
DSM-IV. srrprn note 15, at 40. 
I(/. 
I(/. 
I(/. at 4 1. 
I(/. 





DSM-IV. slrprrr nole 15, at 41. 
lrl. 
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stant care in a highly structured setting?' 
The AAMR sets forth similar, although not identical, standards for 
determining mental retardat i~n.~~ According to the AAMR, a person is 
deemed mentally retarded if he or she has: (1) an IQ below 70-75, (2) 
concurrently existing with limitations in two or more adaptive skill ar- 
eas, (3) which is manifested by age eighteen?9 In a departure from the 
definitions employed by the DSM-IV, the AAMR no longer uses the 
. 
terms "mild," "moderate," "severe," and "profound" to describe an indi- 
vidual's mental retardati~n.~' Instead, the AAMR has developed a "Pro- 
file and Intensities of Needed Supports," which sets out levels of sup- 
port that a mentally retarded person may require?' This profile is in- 
tended to allow a more functional, service-oriented description of the 
mentally retarded indi~idual.4~ 
B. Mental Retardation as Distinguished froin Mental Illness 
It is important to recognize that mental retardation is not a form of 
mental illne~s.4~ This is not to say a mentally retarded individual might 
not suffer from some form of mental illness. Indeed, between twenty to 
thirty-five percent of all non-institutionalized mentally retarded persons 
also have been diagnosed with some form of mental illness.44 However, 
mental retardation is a developmental condition that is different than and 
quite distinct from mental illness. 
The mentally ill experience disturbances in their thoughts that may 
be cyclical, episodic, or and suffer from illnesses such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, psychosis, post-traumatic disorder, and 
the like?6 Mental retardation is not a psychological or medical disor- 
37. Id. at 41-42. 
38. AMERICAN ASS'N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION A D SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 25 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR DEFINITION]. 
39. Id. at 5.25. 
40. Id. at 34. 
41. These support levels are described as intermittent, limited, extensive, and pervasive. An 
individual who requires "intermittent support" is one who requires support on an "as needed, 
basis," such as during a medical crisis or the loss of a job. Such supports, although episodic in 
nature, may be of high or low intensity when provided. "Limited support" is support that is 
consistently required over a limited time span, such as during a transitional period involving 
changing from school to work, or other similar transitions. "Extensive support" involves regular 
involvement at home or work on a long-term basis. "Pervasive support" refers to constant, high- 
intensity support across all areas of life and may include life-sustaining measures. Id. at 26. 
42. Id. at 34. 
43. See Denis W .  Keyes et al.. Mitigating Men~nl Retnrhfion in Capital Cases: Finding The 
"Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 530 (1998); Ellis & 
Luckasson. supra note 13. at 423-27. 
44. AAMR DEFINITION, supra note 38, at 51. 
45. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 424. 
46. Keyes et al., supra note 43, at 530. 
916 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 52:3:911 
der;47 it is a permanent developmental or functional ~ondition.~' Often 
mental illness does not emerge until after the individual is eighteen 
years old.49 In contrast, by its definition, mental retardation manifests 
itself by the time the mentally retarded individual is eighteen.'' More- 
over, certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or 
psychotherapy. Mental retardation cannot be ameliorated by drugs or 
psychotherapy, although the mentally retarded individual may be taught 
skills and strategies to better function in society and may be aided in his 
functioning by various support systems and services." 
Further, unlike mental illness, the risk that a person will be able to 
feign mental retardation to avoid criminal prosecution or to avoid the 
death penalty is greatly reduced, particularly in light of the definitions 
of mental retardation employed by the DSM-IV and AAMR. As noted 
above, one of the criteria for mental retardation is that the disability 
manifests itself before the individual is eighteen years old.52 TO substan- 
tiate mental retardation, therefore, will likely require school and health 
records demonstrating the early manifestation of the disability. In most 
cases, documentation establishing mental retardation, including the rele- 
vant IQ test scores, will exist before a charge of capital murder is filed. 
C. The Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant 
For centuries, the law has recognized that an individual's mental 
retardation may affect his or her capacity to face criminal charges and be 
found criminally liable. At common law, persons who were defined as 
"idiots," which today would correspond with the DSM-IV's classifica- 
tion of severely or profoundly retarded,53 were not subject to criminal 
liability.54 This rule, with its corollary that "lunatics" were also excluded 
from criminal liability, was the precursor to the modem insanity de- 
fense." In this context, the term "idiot" usually referred to a person with 
such a limited reasoning capacity that he could not form the requisite 
criminal intent or could not distinguish between good and eviLS6 A few 
states still use the term "idiot" and provide a corresponding exemption 
47. AAMR DEFINITION, srrprn note 38, at 9. 
48. Id. at 9-10; Keyes et al., strprn note 43, at 530. 
49. Keyes et al., suprn note 43, at 530. 
50. AAMR DEFINITION, suprn note 38, at 16-19; Keyes et al., srrprn note 43, at 530. 
51. DSM-IV, strprn note 15, at 40 (noting that while IQ is likely to remain stable, adaptive 
functioning skills are more likely to improve with remedial efforts); AAMR DEFINITION, scrprn 
note 38, at 145. 
52. See stcprn text accompanying note 50. 
53. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 -33 (1989). 
54. Id. at 331-32. 
55. Id. at 332-33. 
56. Id. at 333. 
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fiom criminal liability." However, in general, modern laws subject per- 
sons with mental retardation to criminal liability. 
In the early twentieth century, the mentally retarded were viewed as 
threatening, dangerous, and a source of criminal conduct or immoral 
behavior." The eugenics movement advocated sterilization and segrega- 
tion of the mentally retarded:9 positions that met with remarkable suc- 
cess in the political and judicial arenas.60 By the middle of the century, 
. 
however, society soundly rejected this view of the mentally retarded.6' It 
is now well-accepted that mental retardation rarely, if ever, causes 
criminal behavior.62 
Nonetheless, mental retardation may have a significant impact on an 
individual who finds himself involved with the criminal justice system, 
particularly in the context of confessions and i n t e r r~~a t i ons .~~  It is well- 
recognized that mental retardation is not a per se bar to voluntary inter- 
rogations and confessions, although it may be a factor to be weighed in 
evaluating the voluntariness of a confe~s ion.~~ Many mentally retarded 
people may be less likely to withstand police coercion or pressure due to 
their limited communication skills, their predisposition to answer ques- 
tions so as to please the questioner rather than to answer the question 
accurately, and their tendency to be submi~sive.~~ Further, it is not un- 
usual for a mentally retarded individual to have an incomplete or imma- 
ture concept of blame and/or c a ~ s a t i o n . ~ ~  This characteristic may cause 
the mentally retarded defendant to confess to an act he did not commit, 
or to accept greater blame or responsibility for criminal activity than he 
realistically sho~ld.~ '  Accordingly, the veracity and accuracy of a con- 
fession by a person with mental retardation may be suspect.68 
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 3 26(2) (West 1999) (providing that "idiots" are a class of 
persons not capable of committing crimes); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 3 152(3) (1990) (providing that 
"idiots" are not capable of committing crimes). Interestingly, neither California nor Oklahoma 
provide a legislative death penalty exemption for the mentally retarded capital defendant. See 
in& text accompanying note 175. 
58. Ellis & Luckasson, supm note 13, at 417. 
59. Id. at 417-19. 
60. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In Buck, Justice Holmes upheld a Vir- 
ginia eugenics statute authorizing the sterilization of the mentally disabled and infamously de- 
clared that "[tlhree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
61. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 420. 
62. Id. But see in@ note 158 and accompanying text. 
63. Ellis & Luckasson, sliprn note 13, at 427-30. 
64. See Connelly v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 157, 164-66 (1986) (mental deficiency alone does not 
render a confession involuntary, although it may be a factor to be weighed in determining volun- 
tariness); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,443 (1961); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 445-52. 
65. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 428,446. 
66. Id. at 445-52. 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 938 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1001 (1981) (granting relief to a mentally deficient, mildly retarded man who gave police 
two vastly different statements during forty-two hours of uncounseled questioning). See Coyne & 
Entzeroth. supra note 2, at 25. 
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Further, mental retardation, in and of itself, does not render an indi- 
vidual incompetent to stand or incompetent to enter a guilty 
plea.70 However, certain characteristics that are common among people 
with mental retardation, such as the tendency to be easily led, a poor 
understanding of the consequences of one's actions, the desire to hide 
one's mental retardation, and the desire to please authority figures, can 
affect the quality and ability of a mentally retarded person to make deci- 
sions that are in his best interest." Thus, the ability of the mentally re- 
tarded defendant to assist counsel in preparing a case and in making 
critical decisions about the course of a capital murder trial may be com- 
promised. 
111. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION ALLOWING THE IMPOSITION OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
A. Background 
The Supreme Court first explicitly sanctioned the execution of the 
mentally retarded in Penry v. ~ ~ n a u ~ h , ~ ~  a plurality opinion authored by 
Justice O'Connor. At the time of his crime, Johnny Paul Penry, a men- 
tally retarded, African-American man, was twenty-two years old. 
69. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (to be competent to stand trial, de- 
fendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree 
of rational understanding" and must have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro- 
ceedings against him"). 
70. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1993) (standard for determining compe- 
tence to plead guilty is same as standard for determining competence to stand trial); Parke v. 
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary); Boykin v. Ala- 
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (record must show that defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to trial). 
71. At~~ericnrl Associntion on Merttnl Retnrdntion. Fnct Slleer: T l ~ e  Dentlz Pennlty (last modi- 
fied June 21, 2000) <http//www.aamr.orglPolicieslfaqdeathpenalty.html. Moreover, once incar- 
cerated, the mentally retarded prisoner faces increased risks and difficulties. For example, the 
mentally retarded inmate is more likely to be abused, victimized, exploited, and injured than other 
prisoners. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 479-80. The mentally retarded inmate is also more 
likely to have disciplinary problems. Id. at 480-81. As a result, the mental retarded prisoner will 
often serve a longer prison term. Id. Unfortunately, there are only limited support systems avail- 
able in prison to assist the mentally retarded. Id. 
72. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). On the other hand, the Court has ruled that a person who is insane at 
the time of  his execution may not be executed. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986). 
Nonetheless, on January 24, 1992, Rickey Ray Rector, a man with obvious and profound mental 
defects, was killed by lethal injection in Arkansas. Coyne & Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 43-44. 
Rector shot and killed a police officer, then shot himself in the forehead; he underwent brain 
surgery that required removal of three inches of  frontal brain tissue. Id. There was no question 
that Rector's mental abilities were significantly impaired. Id. In the days leading up to his execu- 
tion, Rector's behavior included such bizarre acts as barking like a dog, stamping his feet, snap- 
ping his fingers, repeatedly calling out the nickname of an old friend, and laughing. Id. When his 
last meal was served, Rector devoured his dinner, but saved his dessert to be eaten later-after his 
execution. Id. 
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Penry's IQ fell between fifty and sixty-three, 73 which placed him in the 
mild to moderate range of the DSM-IV classification of mental retarda- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  A clinical psychologist who examined Penry indicated that Penry 
had the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old and the social maturity of 
a nine- to ten-year-old.75 As pointed out earlier, mildly retarded indi- 
viduals may learn skills up to the sixth grade level, and persons with 
moderate mental retardation are unlikely to achieve academic skills be- 
yond the second grade 
In addition to his mental retardation, Penry grew up in a home where 
horrible abuse was regularly inflicted upon him.77 Shortly after his birth, 
Penry's mother suffered a nervous breakdown and was committed to a 
mental hospital for ten months.78 When she returned to her young son, 
she subjected him to severe beatings, including blows to his head and 
79 cigarette bums on his body. Penry dropped out of school in the first 
grade and was in and out of state institutions until he was twelve years 
old, after which he went to live with an aunt. It took his aunt a year to 
teach Penry the simple task of printing his name.8' 
After being paroled for a rape conviction, Penry moved to 
Livingston,  exa as.'^ On October 25, 1979, Penry entered the home of 
Pamela Mosely Carpenter, a twenty-two year old white woman and sis- 
ter of Mark Mosley, a professional football player.83 Penry attacked and 
raped Carpenter, who struggled and used a pair of scissors to fend off 
~ e n r ~ . ~ ~  Enraged, Penry stabbed Carpenter with her scissors.85 Carpenter 
died a few hours later during emergency treatment; however, she was 
able to identify Penry as her attacker before her death.86 Penry subse- 
quently gave two confessions to the crime.87 He was charged with capi- 
tal murder. 
73. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21 on DSM-IV classification and skill levels. 
75. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308. 
76. DSM-IV, supra note 15, at 41. 
77. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09; REED, supra note 6 ,  at I .  
78. REED, supra note 6, at 1. 
79. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09; REED, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
80. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309; REED, sicpra note 6 ,  at 2. 
81. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309; REED, supra note 6 ,  at 2. 
82. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636,653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
83. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in 
port and rev'd in par!, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); REED, supra note 6, at 2. As noted 
above, Penry was African-American, and Carpenter was Caucasian. Numerous studies have shown 
that the race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant play a key role in de- 
termining which criminal defendants ultimately will be sentenced to death. See McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 35-40. 
84. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; REED, supra note 6,  at 2. 
85. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; REED, supra note 6, at 2. 
86. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 on confessions by the mentally retarded. 
88. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. 
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A competency hearing was held before Penry's murder Evi- 
dence was presented at the hearing showing that previous testing indi- 
cated Penry's IQ fell between fifty and s i~t~- three .~O IQ testing immedi- 
ately preceding the competency trial revealed an IQ of fifty-four.9' The 
psychologist who tested Penry testified that, "'there's a point at which 
anyone with [Penry's] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know, this 
man is more in the borderline range.'"92 The jury found him competent 
to stand 
During the guiltlinnocence phase of Penry's capital murder trial, 
Penry's two confessions were found to be voluntary and were admitted 
into evidence.94 Penry raised an insanity defense, presenting evidence 
that his mental retardation and brain damage resulted in poor impulse 
control, an inability to learn from his experiences, an inability to appre- 
ciate the wrongfulness of his acts, and an inability to conform his con- 
duct to the law.95 In rebuttal, the State presented evidence that Penry 
was sane at the time of his crime although the State conceded that Penry 
had an extremely limited mental ability and seemed unable to learn from 
his mistakes." The jury rejected Penry's insanity defense and found him 
guilty of capital murder.97 
The case then proceeded to the capital sentencing phase of trial. Un- 
der the Texas death penalty statutory scheme, the jury was required to 
answer three questions or "special issues" to determine Penry's fate. 
Under Section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, the jury had to determine 
whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of 
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reason- 
able expectation that the death of the deceased or another would 
result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would com- 
mit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
89. Under Texas law, a hearing to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial 
is held prior to trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 46.02 (West 2001). Under Article 46.02, 
"A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: ( I )  sufficient present ability to 
consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person." See Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Article 46.02 further provides, a "defendant is presumed 
competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by 
a preponderance of the evidence." 
90. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08. 
91. Id. at 308. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id.; Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 643-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
95. Pettry, 492 U.S. at 308-09. 
96. Id. at 309. 
97. Id. at 3 10. 
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threat to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defen- 
dant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the 
provocation, if any, by the de~eased.9~ 
If the jury answered "yes" to all three questions, the penalty of death 
would be imposed?9 The jury answered "yes" to all three questions, and 
accordingly, the trial court sentenced Penry to death.''' 
Penry appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed.'0' Penry then petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court denied.''' 
Penry next sought federal habeas relief. After the federal district court 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied habeas relief,'03 Penry 
again filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. This time, 
the Supreme Court granted ~er t io ra r i '~~  to answer two questions: (1) 
whether the sentencing instructions adequately advised the jury that they 
were to consider all of Mr. Penry's mitigating evidence, in particular 
evidence of his mental retardation, in determining whether he should be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment; and (2) whether the execution 
of a mentally retarded person constitutes a per se violation of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth ~mendment."~ 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackrnun joined Justice 
OYConnor in answering the first question. These five justices concluded 
that during the sentencing phase of trial, the jury had not been ade- 
quately advised that they were to consider Penry's mental retardation 
and abused childhood as evidence mitigating against the imposition of 
the death penalty.'06 The Court accordingly ordered the case remanded 
for resentencing.'07 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy dis- 
- - - - - - - - - 
98. Id. 
99. For a discussion on the Texas capital sentencing scheme and the constitutionality of the 
three special issues, see Jurek v. Texns, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
100. Penry, 492 U.S. at 3 1 1. 
101. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
102. Penry v. Texas, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986). 
103. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987). For an interesting discussion on Jurek 
and the potential concerns raised by Texas' unique death penalty system, see the concurring opin- 
ion of Judge Ganvood. Penry, 832 F.2d at 926-32. 
104. Penry v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988). 
105. Penry, 492 U.S. at 3 13. 
106. Id. at 313-28. Although an in-depth discussion of this aspect of the Penry decision is be- 
yond the scope of this Article, several scholars have analyzed the Court's finding that Texas failed 
to provide Penry with a meaningful mechanism by which to present and have the jury fully con- 
sider his mental retardation as evidence mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. For 
further discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see e.g., Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Wllnt Hnth Penry 
Wrougl~f? Mitigating Circumsfnnces nnd the Terns Denfli PennIfy, 19 AM. J .  CRIM. L. 345 (1992); 
Note. A Rensoned Morn1 Response: Rethinking Texns S Cnpitnl Sentencing Statute Afier Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REV. 407 (1990). 
107. Penry. 492 U.S. at 340. 
922 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 52:3:911 
agreed, finding that the sentencing instructions did not run afoul of the 
Constitution and that resentencing was not warranted.Io8 
As to the second question, the configuration of the Court was re- 
versed. This time, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy 
joined Justice 07Connor to reject the argument that the imposition of the 
death penalty on the mentally retarded violated the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth ~mendment . "~  Justices Brennan, Mar- 
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented on this issue."0 Pivotal to the 
justices' reasoning is the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
B. The Eighth Amendinent S Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment 
Although the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "cruel 
and unusual punishment," the Constitution does not define or provide 
further guidance on the meaning of those words. The "cruel and unusual 
punishment" prohibition first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 
1689, which was drafted by the British Parliament at the accession of 
William and ~ a r ~ . " '  Apparently, the prohibition was aimed at punish- 
ments that were not authorized by law, or punishments that were dispro- 
portionate to the crime.Il2 The framers of the United States Constitution 
drew on that language and incorporated the "cruel and unusual punish- 
ment" proscription into the Eighth Amendment of the Bill of ~ i ~ h t s . " ~  
It appears that the drafters intended the provision to prohibit, at a mini- 
mum, the forms of punishment banned at the time the Constitution was 
drafted1I4 and intended it to proscribe torture and other barbarous forms 
of punishment.1 l 5  
During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to flesh out 
the contours of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In so doing, 
the Court construed the Eighth Amendment to go beyond merely prohib- 
iting those forms of punishment that were outlawed in colonial times. 
Indeed, the Court found that society's evolving standards of decency 
also should inform and instruct the Court on the parameters of the 
Eighth ~mendment . "~  
108. Id. at 353-60. 
109. Id. at 328-40, 350-51. 
110. Id. at341-50. 
1 1  1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel nnd 
Un~cs~cnl Punishment It~Jicted: " The Originnl Menning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852-53 (1969)). 
112. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. 
1 13. Id. at 169-70. 
114. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,330 (1989). 
1 15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170. 
116. For a discussion on the modem interpretation o f  the Eighth Amendment, see Earl Martin. 
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This construction of the Eighth Amendment first appeared in 1910 
in Wee~ns v. United ~tates."' In Weems, the defendant challenged, inter 
alia, his sentence of fifteen years in chains at hard and painful labor that 
the Court of First Instance for the City of Manila imposed on him for the 
crime of false entry on a public document by a public 0fficia1.I'~ Al- 
though the Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the defendant's 
conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the punishment violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
and reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence with instructions 
to dismiss the The crime for which Weems was con- 
victed harmed no one and did not benefit weems.120 The Court observed 
that Weems' punishment for this crime would "amaze those who have 
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending 
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe 
that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be gradu- 
ated and proportioned to offense."I2' In viewing Weems' punishment in 
the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court de- 
clined to limit the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to those 
forms of punishment outlawed at the time the Constitution was 
drafted.Iu Rather, the Court found that 
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than 
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of 
constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to 
meet passing occasions . . . . In the application of a constitution, 
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been 
but of what may be.'23 
The Court observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
"may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but 
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu- 
mane justice. 9,124 
The Court expanded on Weerns in Trop v. ~u l l e s . ' *~  In 1944, Trop 
was serving as a private in the United States Army when he deserted for 
Tobvnrds nn Evolving Debnre on the Decency ojcnpilnl Pttnisltn~ent, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 84, 
88-93 (1997). 
117.- 217.u.s. 349 (1910). 
118. Weens, 217 U.S. at 357-58. 
119. I d a t 3 8 2 .  
120. Id. at 365. 
121. Id. at 366-67. 
122. Id. at 372-73. 
123. Weens, 217 U.S. at 373. 
124. Id. at 378. 
125. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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one day.'26 Trop was court-martialed for desertion, convicted, and sen- 
tenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay, and a dishonor- 
able discharge.I2' Moreover, as a result of his court-martial and convic- 
tion, Trop, a native-born American, was stripped of his U.S. citizen- 
ship.I2' Trop asked the Court to consider whether the loss of his Ameri- 
can citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment for his crime.'29 
Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated 
that the question before the Court was "whether this penalty [of dena- 
tionalization] subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle 
of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth ~rnendment . " '~~  While 
acknowledging that the exact scope of the Eighth Amendment had not 
been clearly established, the Court nonetheless stated that "[tlhe basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dig- 
nity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civi- 
lized standards."13' The Court then concluded, in language that contin- 
ues to characterize our understanding of the Eighth Amendment, that 
"[tlhe Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'32 Relying on 
this standard, the Court concluded that stripping Trop of his U.S. citi- 
zenship violated the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . ' ~ ~  The Court observed that the 
international community was in virtual agreement that stripping a citizen 
of his citizenship should not be imposed as a form of punishment for the 
crime of de~er t i0n . l~~  This fact, although not determinative, was found to 
support the Court's application of the Eighth Amendment in ~ r o ~ . ' ~ '  
A few years later in Robinson v. ~ a l i f o r n i a , ' ~ ~  the Court found that a 
sentence of ninety days in county jail for the crime of being addicted to 
narcotics constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth ~mendment . '~ '  The Court reasoned that one who is addicted to 
narcotics suffers from an illness and imprisonment on the basis of such a 
disability constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.'38 The Court 
noted, "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, 
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. 
Id. at 87-88. 
Id. 
Id. at 88. 
Id. at 99. 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 
Id. at 101. 
Id. 
Id. at 102-03. 
Id. 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. 
Id. at 667. 
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be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel 
and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold. ,9139 
In 1976, the Supreme Court examined the Eighth Amendment in the 
context of the death penalty. In Gregg v. ~ e o r ~ i a , ' ~ '  the pivotal case in 
which the modern death penalty jurisprudence has its genesis, a plurality 
of the Court followed the reasoning of Weems and Trop and found that 
the Eighth Amendment is to be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic 
manner that reflects society's evolving standards of decency.I4' The 
Court stated that in reviewing the constitutionality of a death sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court must assess "contemporary val- 
ues concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction . . . . [Tlhis as- 
sessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that 
we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a 
,9142 given sanction. However, the Court found that public opinion is not 
the only or the determinative factor to be considered in deciding whether 
a sentence constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.'43 The Court 
found that the punishment must also be in "accord with 'the dignity of 
man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment. 
This means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive. ~ 9 ~ 1 4 4  ~h~ 
Court defined "excessive" as consisting of two elements. First, "the pun- 
ishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain[,]"145 which means that the death penalty as imposed must advance 
the penological goals of retribution and deterren~e. '~~ Second, "the pun- 
ishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime."14' 
C. The Court's Decision in Penry 
Against this backdrop, Justice O'Connor considered the imposition 
of the death penalty in Penly v. ~ ~ n a u ~ h . ' ~ '  In accord with the Court's 
modem Eighth Amendment cases, Justice O'Connor found that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause must be viewed in light of "'the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so- 
139. ld. 
140. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
141. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171. 
142. Id. at 173. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. (citation omitted). 
145. Id. 
146. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
147. Id. On occasion, the Court has found a punishment disproportionate to the crime. See, 
e.g., United States v.  Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1998) (holding fine imposed dispropor- 
tionate to crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (finding death penalty dispropor- 
tionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman). 
148. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
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~ i e t y . " " ~ ~  In making this evaluation, Justice O'Connor applied a two- 
prong test: (1) whether "objective evidence" demonstrates a national 
consensus that the execution of the mentally retarded should be barred; 
and (2) whether the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally re- 
tarded makes a measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of pun- 
ishment and was it proportionate to the crime.IS0 
In addressing the first prong, Justice O'Connor opined that the most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values was found in the 
statutes enacted by the country's legislatures. IS' She also considered the 
actions of sentencing juries in imposing certain punishments on particu- 
lar classes of defendants."' In 1989, at the time the Court decided 
Penry, only Georgia and the federal government exempted the mentally 
retarded from the death penalty.'53 Maryland had enacted legislation 
barring the execution of the mentally retarded, but the legislation went 
into effect a week after the Court handed down ~ e n r ~ . ' ' ~  Justice 
O'Connor stated that even when the Georgia and Maryland statutory 
protections for the mentally retarded were "added to the 14 States that 
have rejected capital punishment completely, [such legislative actions 
did] not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus" 
to exclude the mentally retarded from the punishment of death."' 
Having found that the actions of the state legislatures did not suffi- 
ciently demonstrate a "national consensus" exempting the mentally re- 
tarded from the death penalty, Justice O'Connor then considered other 
evidence that might shed light on how the nation viewed the execution 
of the mentally retarded. Although Penry had not presented the Court 
with evidence regarding the behavior of sentencing juries towards men- 
tally retarded capital defendants, he did offer several public opinion 
polls indicating that a majority of Americans disfavored the execution of 
the mentally retarded and presented evidence that the AAMR and other 
organizations opposed the imposition of the death penalty on the men- 
tally retarded.lS6 Justice O'Connor was not persuaded. She stated: 
The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and 
resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which 
149. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
150. Id. at 328-40. 
151. Id. at 331. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 334. 
154. Penty, 492 U.S. at 334. Pen,y was handed down on June 26, 1989; the Maryland statute 
went into effect on July 1. 1989. 
155. Id. For a criticism of the Court's heavy reliance on state legislation in determining the 
scope and meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see Matthew E. Albers, Note, Legislnlive Defer- 
ence in Eiglrrlr Anretlhnet~r Cnpirnl Senrencing Cl~nllenges: The Constitutionnl Inndequncy of rite 
Crcrrenr Jr~dicicrl Appronclr, 50 CASE W .  RES. L. REV. 467 (1 999). 
156. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35. 
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is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we 
can rely. But at present, there is insufficient evidence of a na- 
tional consensus against executing mentally retarded people 
convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is cate- 
gorically prohibited by the Eighth ~mendment."' 
Having reached this determination, Justice O'Connor turned to the 
second prong of her analysis. She stated that it was clear that mental 
retardation was long regarded as a factor that mitigated against the im- 
position of the death penalty and that all states allowed a defendant to 
submit evidence of his mental retardation as mitigating e~idence."~ 
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor concluded that "[oln the record before 
the Court today, however, I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded 
people of Penry's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone, 
and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal re- 
sponsibility-inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capac- 
ity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death pen- 
alty.'7159 Therefore, and without much further elaboration, Justice 
O'Connor found that the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally 
retarded made a measurable contribution to the penological goals of 
deterrence and retribution and that it was not disproportionate to the 
crime. 
Justice Scalia concurred with Justice O7Connor's ultimate result on 
this question. However, his analysis of the issue was much simpler.160 
He found that in determining whether a punishment comports with the 
Eighth Amendment, he would look only at how the state legislatures and 
the sentencing juries treat the issue.I6' Justice Scalia opined that unless 
157. Id. at 335. 
158. Id. at 337. However, it has also been observed that an individual's mental retardation may 
serve as a double-edged sword. See Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340,2000 WL 16321 (10th Cir. Jan. 
11,2000) (unpublished decision); Michael L. Perlin, Symposium on Cnpitnl Punishn~ent the Snnist 
Lives of Jurors in Denth Pennlty Cnses: The Puzzling Role Of "Mitignting" Mentnl Disnbility 
Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB.'PoL'Y 239 (1994); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A 
Continuing Source Of Aggravation: The Inlproper Consideration of Mitignting Fnctors in Dentlr 
Pennlty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409 (1990). For example, a local South Carolina newspaper 
provided the following analysis of a mentally retarded criminal defendant: 
Down in Conway, a circuit judge has handed down a no-nonsense decision uphold- 
ing law and order. . . . The case involves convicted killer Limmie Arthur, 28, who 
has the social intelligence of a 10- to 12-year-old and the mental ability of a 7-year- 
old. This was enough sense to enable him to kill William "Cripple Jack" Miller in 
1984. . . . It appears to us that there is all the more reason to execute a killer if he is 
also insane or retarded. Killers often kill again; an insane or retarded killer is more 
to be feared than a sane or normal killer. There is also far less possibility of his 
ever becoming a useful citizen. 
Upholding Ln~v nnd Order, HARTSVILLE MESSENGER, June 24, 1987, at SB, col. I.; Coyne & 
Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 41 n.383 
159. Pcnry. 492 U.S. at 338. 
160. Id. at 350-60. 
161. Id. 
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an objective examination of the laws and jury determinations demon- 
strated that the country had "set its face against" a form of punishment, 
such punishment was not proscribed by the Eighth ~mendment . '~ '  
Without discussing Weems, Trop, or Gregg, Justice Scalia found it un- 
necessary for the Court to take the next step and determine whether the 
punishment made a measurable contribution to the goals of punishment 
and whether it was proportionate to the crime.'63 
Given that only three death penalty jurisdictions exempted the men- 
tally retarded from the death penalty, it is not surprising that in his dis- 
sent Justice Brennan sidestepped the "national consensus" issue and 
focused on (1) whether executing the mentally retarded advanced the 
goals of deterrence and retribution, and (2) whether the death penalty 
was disproportionate when imposed on the mentally retarded.'64 Justice 
Brennan stated that in determining whether a punishment advances le- 
gitimate penological goals, one must look not only to the type or form of 
punishment to be imposed, but also one must consider the blameworthi- 
ness of the individual or class of individuals on whom the punishment is 
to be i n f l i~ t ed . ' ~~  Justice Brennan recognized that although there may be 
differences among the mentally retarded in their ability to live inde- 
pendently or semi-independently, the clinical definition of mental retar- 
dation necessarily narrows this class of individuals to persons who have 
significant intellectual and adaptive skills  deficit^.'^^ For this reason, 
Justice Brennan concluded that the mentally retarded lacked sufficient 
moral culpability to advance the goal of retribution, which requires that 
a criminal sentence be directly related to the defendant's personal culpa- 
bility.I6' Further, he reasoned that the goal of deterrence would not be 
advanced, as "[ilt is highly unlikely that the exclusion of the mentally 
retarded from the class of those eligible to be sentenced to death will 
lessen any deterrent effect the death penalty may have for nonretarded 
3,168 potential offenders. . . . Moreover, because of the impairments in the 
ability of a mentally retarded person to understand the consequences of 
his actions and to control his impulses, it is unlikely that the execution 
of the mentally retarded would deter other mentally retarded criminal 
defendants from committing capital 0 f f e n ~ e s . I ~ ~  
As to the proportionality of the punishment, Justice Brennan stated 
that "[tlhe impairment 0f.a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abili- 
162. lrl.at351. 
163. Id. Justice Scalia elaborated on his views on Eighth Amendment analysis in Stnnford v. 
Ketzrucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which was decided the same day as Penry. 
164. Penr)., 492 U.S. at 343-49. 
165. Id. at 343. 
166. Id. at 344-45. 
167. Id. at 348. 
168. Id. 
169. Slnnforc/, 492 U.S. at 348-49. 
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ties, control over impulsive behavior, and moral development in my 
view limits his or her culpability so that, whatever other punishment 
might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and neces- 
sarily disproportionate to his or her blameworthiness and is therefore 
unconstitutional.'y~70 He further found that even if Justice OYConnor's 
assertion that there were some mentally retarded defendants who were 
sufficiently "blameworthy" so as to be subject to the death penalty, the 
capital sentencing process provided an inadequate mechanism by which 
to distinguish among those mentally retarded persons who should be 
subject to the death penalty and those who should not.17' Therefore, Jus- 
tice Brennan concluded that the imposition of the death penalty on the 
mentally retarded was nothing more than a purposeless and needless 
infliction of pain and suffering that violated the Cruel and Unusual Pun- 
ishment ~ 1 a u s e . I ~ ~  
While Justice Brennan's view did not persuade a majority of his 
brethren in 1989, the majority's decision is not necessarily the final 
word on this question. Indeed, in concluding her analysis allowing the 
execution of mentally retarded defendants, Justice O'Connor noted that 
"a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may 
someday emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.""73 However, she did not believe 
that in June of 1989 that day had yet arrived.174 The question now is 
whether a national consensus has been reached indicating that indeed 
society no longer approves of or wishes to sanction the execution of the 
mentally retarded. 
D. Current Legislation 
In the eleven years that have passed since Penry, the national land- 
scape on this issue has changed dramatically. In 1989, only Georgia, 
Maryland, and the federal government exempted the mentally retarded 
fiom the penalty of death. Now, ten more states ban the execution of the 
mentally retarded-Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and washington.I7' In- 
170. Id. at 346. 
171. Id. at 346-47. 
172. Id. at 349. 
173. Id. at 340. 
174. Sfnnford, 492 U.S. at 340. 
175. ARK. CODE ANN. 5 5-4-618(b) (Michie 1993) ("No defendant with mental retardation at 
the time of committing capital murder shall be sentenced to death."); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 16-9- 
403 (Supp. 1994) ("A sentence of death shall not be imposed upon any defendant who is deter- 
mined to be a mentally retarded defendant pursuant to section 16-9-402. If any person who is 
determined to be a mentally retarded defendant is found guilty of a class 1 felony, such defendant 
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment."); GA. CODE ANN. 17-7-1316) (1990 & Supp. 1994) 
("In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1, 
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terestingly, Kansas and New York only recently re-instated the death 
penalty, and in so doing each state expressly excluded the mentally re- 
tarded. Connecticut, while not explicitly excluding the mentally retarded 
from the penalty of death, provides that the death penalty shall not be 
imposed on an individual whose "mental capacity was significantly im- 
paired or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law 
was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to con- 
stitute a defense to prosecution. ,9176 
In states that ban the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally 
retarded, the state usually requires the mentally retarded defendant to 
put forth evidence of his mental retardation. For example, section 
532.140 of the Kentucky Penal Code prohibits the execution of "a seri- 
ously mentally retarded offender." This statute went into effect on July 
13, 1990, a little more than a year after the Court handed down Penry. 
To seek an exemption from the death penalty under this statutory provi- 
sion, defense counsel must file a motion with the trial court within thirty 
days of trial stating that the defendant is seriously mentally retarded and 
present evidence of the mental r e t a rda t i~n . '~~  The Commonwealth may 
1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but mentally retarded or the jury or court 
find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged but mentally retarded, the death 
penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for 
life."); IND. CODE Q: 35-36-9-6 (1994) ("If the court determines that the defendant is a mentally 
retarded individual under section 5 of  this chapter, the part of  the state's charging instrument filed 
under IC 35-50-2-9(a) that seeks a death sentence against the defendant shall be dismissed."); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. jj 21-4623(d) (Supp. 1994) ("If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this 
section, the court determines that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall sentence the 
defendant as otherwise provided by law, and no sentence of death shall be imposed hereunder."); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. jj 532.140(1) (Michie 1990) ("no offender who has been determined to be a 
seriously mentally retarded offender under the provisions of  KRS 532.135, shall be subject to 
execution"); MD. CODE ANN., Crimes and Punishments, jj 412(g)(l) (1992) ("If a person found 
guilty of  murder in the first degree was, at the time the murder was committed, less than 18 years 
old o r  if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person was, at the time 
the murder was committed, mentally retarded, the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
life or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole and may not be sentenced to 
death."); NEB. REV. STAT. jj 28-105.01(2) (1997) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of  law, 
the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person with mental retardation."); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. jj 31-20A-2.1(B) (Michie 1994) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person 
who is mentally retarded."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW jj 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 1995) ("In the 
event the defendant is sentenced pursuant to this section to death, the court shall thereupon render 
a finding with respect to whether the defendant is mentally retarded. If the court finds the defen- 
dant is mentally retarded, the court shall set aside the sentence of death and sentence the defen- 
dant either to life imprisonment without parole o r  to a term of  imprisonment for the class A-I 
felony of  murder in the first degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole."); 
TENN. CODE ANN. jj 39-13-203(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Notwithstanding any provision of law 
to the contrary, no defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder 
shall be sentenced to death."); WASH. REV. CODE g 10.95.030(2) (1993) ("In no case, however, 
shall a person be sentenced to death if the person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was 
committed"). 
176. CONN. GEN. STAT. jj 53a-46a(h)(2) (1994). 
177. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. jj 532.135 (Michie 1999). See id. jjjj 202B.010(9), 210.005. These 
provisions regulate health and social services for the mentally retarded and provide the same 
definition for mental retardation. 
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present evidence in rebuttal. The trial court will make a determination 
ten days before trial as to whether the defendant is seriously mentally 
retarded and whether he should be subject to the death penalty. 
The definition of "seriously mentally retarded," as used by the Ken- 
tucky Legislature, is in accord with the DSM-IV. Section 532.130 of the 
Kentucky Penal Code defines a "seriously mentally retarded" criminal 
defendant as one "with significant subaverage intellectual functioning 
existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and 
,3178 manifested during the developmental period. Consistent with the 
DSM-IV, "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" is 
defined as an IQ below seventy.17' Thus, had Penry committed his crime 
in Kentucky, he would not have been eligible for the death penalty. 
If the trial court concludes that a criminal defendant is exempt from 
the death penalty due to his mental retardation, he remains subject to the 
other penalties that may be imposed on a person who is convicted of a 
capital offense.'80 These penalties are quite severe and include: (1) life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, (2) life imprisonment 
without the benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served 
a minimum of twenty-five years, (3) life imprisonment, or (4) a term of 
imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than fifty years.18' 
Even if the trial court concludes that a defendant is not mentally re- 
tarded, a defendant's mental condition and his limited mental abilities 
may be considered factors that mitigate against the imposition of the 
death penalty in accordance with penry.lg2 
Nebraska employs a similar statutory scheme to determine whether a 
criminal defendant should be excluded from the death penalty based on 
his mental retardation. In exempting the mentally retarded from the 
death penalty, Nebraska also uses the DSM-IV definition. Section 28- 
105.01 of Nebraska Revised Statutes defines mental retardation as "sig- 
nificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concur- 
rently with deficits in adaptive behavior. An intelligence quotient of 
seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test 
shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation." If a court finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal defendant is mentally 
retarded, he may not be sentenced to death, but may be sentenced to life 
imprisonment for capital murder.lR3 Thus, it is unlikely Penry would 
178. Id. Q 532.130. This provision does not define "developmental period." As noted earlier, 
the DSM-IV refers to 18 as the age by which mental retardation must be manifested. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. $8 507.020,532.030(1). 
181. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Q 532.030(1). For a discussion on the mentally retarded inmate see 
suprn note 71 and accompanying text. 
182. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1994); Smith v. Commonwealth, 845 
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1993). 
183. NEB. REV. STAT. Q 28.105.01(3) (Supp. 2000). 
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have been sentenced to death in Nebraska. 
Over the past eleven years, legislation to ban the execution of the 
mentally retarded has surfaced in other states.Is4 In the first two months 
of the year 2000, legislators in seven states introduced bills to ban the 
execution of the mentally retarded. In January 2000, Arizona state legis- 
lators introduced legislation in both the Arizona house and senate to 
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on any individual who was 
found to be mentally retarded.'" On February 1, 2000, six Alabama state 
senators introduced several bills that, inter alia, would exempt the men- 
tally retarded from the death penalty.'86 Similarly, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and South Dakota legislators introduced legislation seeking 
to exempt the mentally retarded from the state's death penalty.'87 In late 
January 2000, Illinois Senate Bill 1488 and Illinois House Bill 4017 
were introduced seeking to amend the Illinois Criminal Code by prohib- 
iting the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded."' On 
January 3 1, 2000, the Governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on the 
death penalty in that state until certain grave concerns about the system 
were addressed.lS9 Given these legislative changes, one must wonder 
whether or not Justice O'Connor's forewarning that this issue someday 
might require reconsideration has now come to pass. 
IV. THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF A NATIONAL AND/OR CONSTITUTIONAL 
BAN ON THE EXECUTION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
Several state appellate judges recently concluded that the execution 
of the mentally retarded violates the standards of decency that mark a 
maturing society and have found that Penry is no longer valid, particu- 
larly in light of the national trend towards exempting the mentally re- 
tarded from capital punishment. In his dissenting opinion in Lambert v. 
~ t a t e , ' ~ '  Judge Charles Chapel of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap- 
peals'9' concluded that the execution of the mentally retarded violated 
the "cruel or unusual punishment" clause of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
Judge Chapel described Lambert, the mentally retarded criminal defen- 
dant who was seeking relief from his death sentence, as follows: 
184. Bing, sriprn note 3, at 1 14-38. 
185. Ariz. S.B. 1455, Ariz. H.B. 2532 (Ariz. 44th Leg. - 2d Reg. Sess. 2000). 
186. Ala. S.B. 7, 60 (Ala. Reg. Sess. 2000). 
187. Miss. Bill No. 2389 (Reg. Sess. of Miss. Leg. 2000); Mo. H.B. 1225 (Mo. 2d Reg. Sess. 
of the 90th Gen. Assembly 2000); Okla. H.B. 2713 (2000); South Dakota H.B. 1196 (S. D. 75th 
Leg. Assembly 2000) 
188. 111. H.B. 4017, 111. S.B. 1488 (111. 91st Gen. Assembly -- 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.). 
189. Richard Wolf, I l l i ~ ~ o i s  Will Delny Dent11 Sentences; Executions Fnce O ~ h e r  ChnNenges, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 3 1,2000, at 4A. 
190. 984 P.2d 22 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). 
191. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest state court in Oklahoma to hear 
criminal cases. 
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Although he is a grown man, Lambert cannot make change. He 
spells no better than a seven year old and reads at a third grade 
level. When Lambert was seventeen years old, the Oklahoma 
Juvenile Services Division tested him. The State's testing re- 
vealed that Lambert has an IQ of 68 and that he is mentally re- 
tarded. Prior to this testing, Lambert struggled through special 
education classes. Lambert barely managed to get through kin- 
dergarten. Finally he dropped out of school when he was in the 
seventh grade. Lambert was never able to function successfully 
in a school setting, and after he dropped out of school, his men- 
tal retardation limited his ability to work or survive in the out- 
side world. Lambert's entire life has been shaped by his mental 
retardation. Although he is now thirty years old, he has the men- 
tal age of an eight year old. His thinking and reasoning are 
equivalent to that of a child in the second or third grade. His 
moral culpability is, of necessity, on the same leve1.Ig2 
Judge Chapel focused his discussion on Article 11, Section 9 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, which bars the imposition of "cruel or unusual 
punishment" and provides arguably broader protection to Oklahoma 
defendants than the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punish- 
ment" proscription.193 Judge Chapel concluded: 
It is our duty to interpret and enforce the Oklahoma Constitu- 
tion. Given Oklahoma's traditional protection of the mentally re- 
tarded, the growing national ban on the execution of the men- 
tally retarded, and the lack of penological goals advanced by the 
execution of these individuals, I believe the execution of the . 
mentally retarded is a cruel or unusual punishment prohibited 
under Oklahoma law. I therefore respectfully dissent to the exe- 
cution of a mental1 retarded man who has the mental age of an 
eight-year-old boy. x 4  
This issue also arose before the California Supreme Court. In People 
v.  nithe he^,'^^ Justice Mosk concluded in a concurring opinion that Penry 
is no longer valid under the Eighth Amendment in light of the legislative 
changes that have taken place since 1989. Justice Mosk stated: 
I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause [of 
the United States Constitution] now prohibits execution of a sen- 
- - - - -  
192. Lonlberf, 984 P.2d at 240. 
193. Dodd v. State, 879 P.2d 822, 828-30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (Chapel. J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
194. Lomberf, 984 P.2d at 244 (footnote omitted). 
195, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., concurring). 
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tence of death against mentally retarded persons. I am able to 
discern that, since Penry, "evolving standards of decency" have 
indeed evolved sufficiently in this area. Indeed, I cannot do oth- 
erwise. For I find that the requisite "national consensus" has, in 
fact, ernerged.lg6 
In a footnote, Justice Mosk also stated that Article I, Section 17 of the 
California Constitution precluded the imposition of the death penalty on 
the mentally retarded.I9' Like the Oklahoma Constitution, the California 
Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment 
and provides greater protection to defendants in California than does the 
Eighth Amendment. 
Although he concluded that the mentally retarded could not be exe- 
cuted under either the California or U.S. Constitution, Justice Mosk de- 
termined that the defendant before the court was not mentally retarded 
and therefore was not exempt from the death penalty. The majority 
agreed with Justice Mosk that the defendant was not mentally retarded. 
A majority of the court, however, was unwilling to declare that the exe- 
cution of the mentally retarded was unconstitutional. The majority sim- 
ply stated, "[W]e determine that defendant is not mentally retarded 
within the meaning of other states' laws exempting mentally retarded 
individuals from the death penalty. Therefore, assuming, for the sake of 
argument only, that the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the 
mentally retarded, it does not render defendant's sentence in~alid."'~' 
In light of the recent legislative changes and the recent state court 
decisions, advocates seeking a death penalty exemption for the mentally 
retarded need to determine if it would be effective to press the Supreme 
Court to reconsider Penry at this time. Deciding this question requires 
an examination of the justices' varying views on "national consensus" 
and "evolving standards of decency." 
A. Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens is the only member of the Penry dissent still on the 
Court. In Perzry, Justice Stevens simply stated that he found the execu- 
tion of the mentally retarded unconstitutional. He did not discuss the 
scope of "national consensus." It is reasonable to assume that he would 
again conclude that the execution of the mentally retarded violates the 
Eighth Amendment. Further, in the context of the execution of juveniles, 
Justice Stevens has found that a national consensus exists to preclude 
196. St~tirlrejr, 978 P.2d at 1224. 
197. Id. at 1225 n.1. 
198. Id. at 1222. 
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the execution of persons who were under the age of sixteen at the time 
of the commission of the crime based on the eighteen death penalty 
states that specifically exempt such youthful offenders from the death 
penalty.199 He also has found there is a national consensus barring the 
execution of juveniles who were under the age of eighteen at the time of 
the commission of the crime based on, among other factors, the twelve 
death penalty states that bar such executions.200 Thus, Justice Stevens 
would likely find that the twelve states that currently exempt the men- 
tally retarded from capital punishment are sufficient to constitute a na- 
tional consensus. 
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy all 
agreed in Penry that in 1989 a national consensus did not exist to ex- 
empt the mentally retarded fiom the punishment of death.201 These jus- 
tices also have indicated that they are unwilling to examine whether a 
punishment advances the goals of deterrence or retribution, or whether a 
punishment is proportionate to the crime and the offender.202 It appears 
that the only argument that will sway these justices is the number of 
states precluding a particular punishment in general or the infliction of 
that punishment on a particular class of individuals. 
On the same day as the Court decided Penry, Justice Scalia an- 
nounced a plurality opinion in which the Court found that it did not vio- 
late the Eighth Amendment for a state to execute a person who was six- 
teen or seventeen at the time he committed his crime.203 In determining 
whether there existed objective criteria reflecting society's view with 
regard to the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, Justice 
Scalia wrote: 
Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 de- 
cline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to 
199. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In a plurality opinion authored by Jus- 
tice Stevens, the Court concluded that states could not execute anyone who was under the age of 
sixteen at the time of the crime. Tllonipson, 487 U.S. at 838. The defendant in Tl~on~pson was 
William Wayne Thompson, who at the age of fifteen plotted with three companions to kill his 
brother-in-law. Id. at 819. Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of capital murder, and sen- 
tenced to death. Id. at 820. Although at the time of Thompson's trial Oklahoma had not estab- 
lished a minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty, eighteen other death penalty states 
set a minimum age of at least sixteen. Id. at 829. Nineteen death penalty states, including Okla- 
homa, set no age limit on the imposition of the death penalty. Tllon~pson, 487 U.S. at 826-27. 
200. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382-91 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & 
Stevens. JJ. dissenting). 
201. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., & 
Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
202. Penry, 492 U.S. at 351. 
203. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361. 
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impose it on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish the 
degree of national consensus this Court has previously thou ht % 
sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.20 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy agreed that these numbers 
were insufficient to form a national consensus. Thus, twelve states were 
insufficient to convince these justices that a national consensus existed 
limiting the imposition of the death penalty on a seventeen-year-old. 
Further, these justices declined to find that eighteen states constitute a 
sufficient number to form a national consensus barring the infliction of 
the death penalty on a certain class of  defendant^.^" It is unlikely that 
they will be persuaded by the twelve states that now ban the execution 
of the mentally retarded to find that there is now a national consensus 
exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty. 
C. Justice O'Connor 
In Penry, Justice O'Connor left open the possibility that someday 
the execution of the mentally retarded might violate the Eighth Amend- 
ment, provided that more states and/or sentencing juries indicate that 
such punishment was out of step with the country's evolving standards 
of decency. However, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia 
and Kennedy, it seems unlikely that the legislative changes of the past 
eleven years will be sufficient to satisfy Justice O'Connor. 
Justice O'Connor's views on the execution of juveniles is instructive 
in determining how she may react to the legislative changes that have 
occurred with respect to the execution of the mentally retarded. In the 
year before the Court decided Peniy, Justice O'Connor stated that evi- 
dence showing that eighteen death penalty states exempted juveniles 
under the age of sixteen from the death penalty was indicative of "a na- 
tional consensus forbidding the execution" of such persons.206 However, 
Justice O'Connor was "reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of 
constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess. ,9207 
Rather, Justice O'Connor took the unusual position of concluding that 
the state legislature had not intended by its silence to include fifteen- 
year-olds among those criminal defendants who were death eligible. She 
found that "[the] petitioner and others who were below the age of 16 at 
the time of their offense may not be executed under the authority of a 
capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the 
204. Id. at 370-71 (footnote omitted). 
205. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 867-68 (1988) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & 
White, J .  dissenting). 
206. Tl~on~pson, 487 U . S .  at 848. 
207. Id. at 849. 
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commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution. ~ ~ 2 0 8  
In Stanford v. Kentucky, however, Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy in finding that the protection 
that twelve death penalty states extended to seventeen-year-olds was 
insufficient to compel the conclusion that such executions violated the 
Eighth Amendment. Thus, it appears unlikely that Justice O'Connor 
would view the current mental retardation exemption legislation as suf- 
ficient to signal a national consensus. 
D. Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas was not on the Supreme Court when Penry was de- 
cided. However, Justice Thomas has often aligned with Justice Scalia on 
questions concerning the Eighth ~mendment :~~ and has taken restrictive 
views of the protection that the Eighth Amendment provides in capital 
sentencing proceedings.210 It seems reasonable to conclude that Justice 
Thomas would join in finding no national consensus exempting the men- 
tally retarded from the punishment of death. 
E. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer 
Likewise, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer were not on the 
bench when Penry was decided. These justices appear to hold views 
more closely in keeping with Justice Stevens' positions on the Eighth 
Amendment and capital sentencing However, these jus- 
tices have not ruled on an issue involving a "national consensus" in the 
context of the Eighth Amendment or the death penalty, and they do not 
always align themselves with Justice Stevens on questions involving 
208. Id. at 857-58. 
209. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860 (1998) (joining Justice 
Scalia in a concurring opinion regarding application of Eighth Amendment in a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 
excessive force case); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993) (dissenting with Justice 
Scalia and finding Eighth Amendment does not protect inmates from risk of harm); Hudson v. 
McMillian. 503 U.S. 1, 17-29 (1992) (dissenting with Justice Scalia and finding that Eighth 
Amendment is not applicable in cases challenging a prisoner's conditions of confinement or the 
use of excessive force on a prisoner). 
210. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
finding capital sentencing jury instruction adequately advised jury of its duty to consider mitigat- 
ing evidence); but see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (Thomas delivered the 
opinion of the Court finding fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment while Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented). 
21 1. See, e.g., Weeks, 528 U.S. at 237 (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); 
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 405 (1999) (Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, & Breyer, JJ., dis- 
senting); Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 11 14 (1999) (Souter, Ginsburg, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting 
to a denial of certiorari to address whether application of California's three strike rule to a person 
who commits a misdemeanor violates the Eighth Amendment); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 
269, 280 (1998) (Breyer, Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 
151, 168-78 (1997) (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting and finding fundamental 
error occurred during capital sentencing proceedings). 
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capital punishment."' Therefore, it is unclear how they would react to 
an invitation to overturn Penry. 
F. The Viability of Raising This Issue Before the Current Supreme 
Court and Alternative Avenues for Achieving a National Ban on the 
Execution of tlze Mentally Retarded 
Unlike 1989, no member of the current Court is a death penalty abo- 
litionist. While it is possible that Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg 
might join Justice Stevens in finding a national consensus precluding the 
execution of the mentally retarded, it is not clear that these three justices 
would take this position. Further, it seems doubtful that a majority of the 
Court would find the states' present position on this issue sufficient to 
support a national consensus. Hence, it would appear that raising this 
issue before the Supreme Court in the hopes of crafting a death penalty 
exclusion for the mentally retarded is likely to fail. 
However, other, more viable avenues exist for seeking a national 
ban on the execution of the mentally retarded. The most obvious (and to 
date the most successful) is to seek relief with state legislatures. As 
mentioned earlier, several states have bills currently pending that would 
ban the execution of the mentally retarded. Moreover, the Governor of 
Illinois has imposed a moratorium on the death penalty in his state. Al- 
though the Illinois moratorium focuses primarily on the grave risk that 
an innocent person might be executed under the current death penalty 
system, the risk of executing an innocent person is heightened in the 
context of the mentally retarded defendant who is more likely to confess 
to a crime he did not commit or to accept greater responsibility for a 
criminal act than he actually de~erves."~ Further, given the potential 
problems that a mentally retarded criminal defendant might have in 
communicating with his lawyer, there is an increased risk that certain 
defenses or mitigating evidence might not be explored."4 In light of 
these factors, legislators might be more receptive to the need to protect 
the mentally retarded defendant. Moreover, this issue resounds not only 
with groups and individuals who traditionally oppose the death penalty, 
but also with mental health organizations and the public at large. The 
broader spectrum of political forces that oppose the execution of the 
mentally retarded offer a greater chance of success in state legislatures. 
212. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995). Justice Stevens dissented while Jus- 
tices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined the majority's holding that the Eighth Amendment does 
not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury ver- 
dict. 
213. See sriprn text accompanying notes 63-68. 
2 14. See srtprn text accompanying notes 69-7 1 .  
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In addition to seeking a legislative exemption for the mentally re- 
tarded, advocates should also seek to use state constitutions to argue that 
the execution of the mentally retarded offends the state's Eighth 
Amendment equivalent. Although a state constitution must afford at 
least as much protection to its citizens as does the federal constitution, a 
state constitution may provide greater protection to defendants appear- 
ing before its c0urts.2~~ As Justice Mosk stated in People v. Sinithey, the 
California prohibition on cruel or unusual punishmen?16 is broader than 
the federal prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Mosk 
would find that the execution of the mentally retarded offends the state 
~onstitution.2~' Other state constitutions also forbid the imposition of 
cruel or unusual punishments,218 and it is possible, although clearly not 
certain, that this distinction could provide greater protection to citizens 
than the Eighth ~rnendment.2~' Other states provide, "Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punish- 
9,220 ments inflicted. This language likewise provides arguably broader 
protection than the Eighth Amendment. Most other states employ the 
"cruel and unusual punishment" language; however, advocates for men- 
tally retarded criminal defendants should carefully review the state's 
applicable case law for broader applications of this language. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although it appears that the current Supreme Court may not be re- 
ceptive to finding that a national consensus bars the execution of the 
mentally retarded at this time, advocates who wish to spare the mentally 
retarded from the death penalty should not despair. Rather, advocates 
seeking to exempt the mentally retarded from capital punishment must 
continue to seek relief in the state legislatures and courts. If these efforts 
continue to be successful-as they have been thus far in twelve states- 
215. James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Cllnllenging the Dent11 Pennlty Under Sfnre Con- 
sfifufions. 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299 (1989). 
216. Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution provides that "cruel and unusual 
punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed." 
217. See Lambert v. State, 984 P.2d 221,240-43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (Chapel, J., dissent- 
ing in part and concurring in part). 
218. The following states exclude "cruel or unusual" punishments: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. 
I, (j 15); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 2, (j 9); Hawaii (HAWAII CONST. art. 1, (j 12); Indiana (IND. 
CONST. art. 1 ,s  16); Maine, ME. CONST. art. 1, (j 9); Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26); 
Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. 1, (j 16); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. I ,  (j 5); Mississippi (MISS. 
CONST. art. 3, (j 28); Nevada (NEv. CONST. art. 1, (j 6); New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. pt. I ,  art. 
33); North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. 1, (j 27); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. 1, (j l I); and 
Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 1, (j 9). Further, Article 1, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution 
provides, "No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or 
unusual punishment." 
219. Acker & Walsh. s~cpm note 215, at 13 15-31. 
220. DEL. CONST. art. 1, (j 11; KY. CONST. (j 17; PA. CONST. art. 1, (j 13; R.1. CONST. art. 1, Q: 
8; S.D. CONST. art. 6, (j 23; WASH. CONST. art. I , $  14; and S.C. CONST. art. I, (j 15. 
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then, a majority of the Supreme Court will likely find that a national 
consensus indeed exists and that the execution of the mentally retarded 
is a barbaric form of punishment prohibited under the Eighth Amend- 
ment. 
The Supreme Court remanded Penry for re-sentencing so that a jury 
could fully consider his mental retardation as a factor mitigating the 
imposition of the death penalty. Despite this mitigating evidence, a 
Texas jury was not persuaded to spare Penry, and Penry again was sen- 
tenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry's 
conviction and sentence? and the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas denied Penry's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. Penry was scheduled for execution on January 13, 2 0 0 0 . ~ ~ ~  The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay of execution pending re- 
view of Penry's motion for a certificate of appealability appealing the 
federal district court's denial of habeas relief. On June 20, 2000, the 
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Penry's certificate of appealability and 
upheld the federal district court's denial of habeas re~ief."~ 
On November 27, 2000, after the writing of this Article, the Su- 
preme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions regarding 
Penry's second trial. First, the Court will consider whether the jury in- 
structions allowed adequate consideration of Penry's mental retardation 
as a factor mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. Sec- 
ond, the Court will examine whether Penry's Fifth Amendment rights 
were violated during the course of the state court proceedings. The 
Court did not state that it intended to revisit the question of whether the 
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth ~mendment ."~ 
Johnny Paul Penry continues to await execution on Texas' death row. 
However, on March 26, 2001 the Court granted certiorari in McCawer 
v. North ~arolina,2'~ to address specifically the question of whether the 
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Since the writing of this Article, South Dakota has joined those death 
penalty states barring the execution of the mentally retarded so that now 
221. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 
222. Jamie Fellner, Mentnlly Rernrdecl Defendants Don 'I Belong on Death Row, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 4,2000, at A 19. 
223. Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2000). By a vote of two-to-one, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the lower federal court's denial of habeas relief. Circuit Court Judge 
Dennis dissented on the grounds that the Texas death penalty scheme still did not allow the jury to 
give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence regarding his mental retardation and history of child- 
hood abuse. Penry, 215 F.3d at 514-1 6. 
224. See Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 563 (2000). 
225. No. 2001 WL 215804 (March 26,2001). 
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thirteen states and the federal government exclude the mentally retarded 
from the punishment of death. 

